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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This is an appeal from an interlocutory order dated
August

25,

1992

(granting

partial

summary

judgment

on

liability only) and a final Order and Judgment dated December
16, 1992.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(h).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying

Defendant's Motion to Amend its Answer to assert fraud in the
inducement?

The standard for review is whether the trial

court abused its discretion in the circumstances of the case
by refusing the amendment. Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way
Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
2.

Did the trial court err in granting Plaintiff's

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on liability despite
evidence of the existence of fraud in the inducement?

In

reviewing such issue, all pleadings, evidence, admissions and
inferences therefrom must be viewed in a light most favorable
to Defendant/Appellant.

Frederick May & Company v. Dunn, 368

P.2d 266 (Utah 1962); Durham v. Maraetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah
1977).

1

3.

Did the trial court err in granting

Plaintiff's

Motion for Summary Judgment on damages based on a "per annum"
interest
rate despite language in the Note stating a flat interest
rate?

The standard for review is the same as noted in

paragraph 2.
4.

Did the trial court err in denying Defendant's

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with respect to the
interest rate?

In reviewing such issue, all pleadings,

evidence, admissions and inferences therefrom must be viewed
in a light most favorable to Plaintiff/Appellee.

See cases

cited in paragraph 2.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Defendant

does

not

contend

any

authorities

are

determinative of any issues involved in the appeal. However,
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-3 have a bearing on
the issues relating to the interest rate addressed in Points
III and IV.

The wording of Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-3 is as

follows:
Whenever in any statute or deed, or
written or verbal contract, or in any
public or private instrument whatever,
any certain rate of interest is mentioned
and no period of time is stated, interest

2

shall be calculated at the rate mentioned
by the year,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF CASE AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT.
This is an action to enforce the provisions of a
Promissory

Note

(hereinafter
Agreement

"Gump

(R.

108-109)

executed

& Ayers") pursuant

to

by

Defendant

a

Settlement

(R. 104-106) which was intended to settle and

compromise Gump & Ayers1 liability to Plaintiff (hereinafter
"Union Park")
for past and future rents under a pre-existing lease of real
property.
Gump & Ayers executed the Settlement Agreement and
Promissory Note in reliance on the prior representation of
Union Park that the leased premises were still vacant with no
prospects for a replacement tenant (R. 192). Thus, a portion
of the principal of the Promissory Note was attributable to
settle Union Park's claims for future rents under the lease
(R. 194-195).

If Gump & Ayers had known that the leased

premises had already been re-let to replacement tenant, it
would not have executed a Promissory Note for a principal sum
in excess of the total of accrued rents (R. 192).

3

At the time Gump & Ayers filed its Answer, it had
received information that the representations of Union Park
were false, i.e., that the leased premises had already been
leased to a replacement tenant prior to execution of the
Settlement Agreement and Promissory Note (R. 195-196). Thus,
Gump & Ayers had reason to believe that the Settlement
Agreement and Promissory Note had been procured by fraud on
the part of Union Park.

However, after considering this

information, counsel for Gump & Ayers, in a good faith effort
to comply with Rule 11, U.R.C.P., refrained from asserting
fraud as a defense until the information could be confirmed
and corroborated (R. 195-196).
At a later point in the litigation, Gump & Ayers
confirmed the accuracy of the information concerning fraud (R.
135-155).

Accordingly, counsel for Gump & Ayers immediately

moved the Court to amend Gump & Ayers1 Answer to assert the
defense of fraud in inducing the execution of the Settlement
Agreement and Promissory Note (R. 235).
On August 25, 1992, the lower court denied Gump & Ayers1
Motion to Amend, and granted summary judgment on the issue of
liability under the Promissory Note despite clear evidence
that execution of the Promissory Note was induced by fraud on

4

the part of Union Park (R. 470-472); (copy of the Order
attached as Exhibit "C").
The Promissory Note provided:

". . • this Note shall

bear interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) from and after
May 1, 1988." (R. 108-109) There was no suggestion of a "per
annum" interest rate.

The Promissory Note, including the

language relating to the interest rate, was unilaterally
drafted by Union Park and its attorneys (R. 251).
On December 16, 1992, the lower court computed the
judgment amount on the basis of an interest rate of 10% per
annum and entered judgment in the sum of $35,157.59. At the
same time, the lower court denied Gump & Ayers1 Motion for
Summary Judgment wherein Gump & Ayers sought a ruling that the
interest rate should be limited to a flat rate of 10% (R. 606608) (copy of Order and Judgment attached as Addendum Exhibit
"D").

These rulings were made on the basis of the wording of

the Note without consideration of extrinsic evidence.

See

transcript of Judge's bench ruling of November 30, 1992, p. 1
(R. 743-748) (copy of transcript attached as Addendum Exhibit
"B").
FACTS RELEVANT TO LIABILITY UNDER THE PROMISSORY NOTE
On or about June 1, 1983, Gump & Ayers and Union Park
entered into a Lease Agreement wherein Gump & Ayers, as
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lessee, leased approximately 4,497 square feet of office space
in a building owned by Union Park at Union Park Center in
Midvale, Utah,
54, 65-80).

(Lloyd Affidavit, paras. 5, 6; Exhibit A, R.

The Lease was for a period of ten years (Lloyd

Affidavit, para. 6; Exhibit A R. 54, 65-80).
On or about June 28, 1985, the parties entered into a
second Lease for an additional 912 square feet adjacent to the
existing leased office space (Lloyd Affidavit, paras. 7,8;
Exhibit B, R. 54-55, 81-102).

The second Lease was intended

to expire at or about the same time as the first Lease (Lloyd
Affidavit, para. 9, R. 55).
The

office

space

included

in both

of

the

leases will

hereinafter be referred to as "subject premises."
Gump & Ayers is a licensed real estate broker engaged in
the business of selling, purchasing and leasing real property.
(Floor Affidavit, para. 2, R. 189).

By reason of adverse

conditions in the real estate market, Gump & Ayers determined
that it must close several of its offices including the office
at the subject premises (Floor Affidavit, para. 4. R. 190).
Gump & Ayers substantially vacated the subject premises on May
28, 1988 (Floor Affidavit, para. 4, R. 190).
At the time it vacated the premises, Gump & Ayers was
fully aware that it remained liable for future lease payment
6

obligations despite the fact that the subject premises had
been vacated. Gump & Ayers was further aware that Union Park
had an obligation to mitigate this liability by expending
efforts to find a replacement tenant (Floor Affidavit, para.
5, R. 190-191). During the period beginning when the premises
was vacated in May, 1988, and continuing through mid-November,
1988, there was frequent communication between Gump & Ayers
and Union Park concerning their efforts to find a replacement
tenant to occupy the vacant subject premises (Floor Affidavit,
para. 5, R. 190-191).
Almost immediately after Gump & Ayers vacated the subject
premises, Gump & Ayers contacted Matrix Funding Corporation
(hereinafter "Matrix") in an effort to persuade it to occupy
the

subject

premises

and

thereby

liability of Gump & Ayers.

decrease

the

ongoing

Matrix was a co-tenant that

occupied other space in the
same building.

Matrix expressed some interest in occupying

the vacated premises (Floor Affidavit, para. 6, R. 191).
Gump & Ayers immediately notified Union Park of the
interests of Matrix in occupying the vacated leased premises.
However, at the time of the notice, Union Park indicated that
they had already communicated with Matrix and Matrix was not
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interested in occupying the vacant subject premises (Floor
Affidavit, para. 6, R. 191).
In mid-November, 1988, Union Park initiated communication
with Gump & Ayers concerning the subject premises.

At that

time Union Park represented to Gump & Ayers that the premises
were still vacant, no prospective tenants had been located and
invited Gump & Ayers to negotiate a lump-sum figure to finally
settle and compromise Gump & Ayers1 liability for past and
future lease payments (Floor Affidavit, para. 7, R. 191-192).
In reliance on the statements of Union Park, Gump & Ayers
entered

into negotiations

to

settle and

compromise

its

liability for past and future rent payments (Floor Affidavit,
para. 7, R. 191-192).
The negotiations between Union Park and Gump & Ayers
resulted in a Settlement Agreement and Promissory Note dated
December 7, 1988 (Floor Affidavit, para. 8, R. 102). A copy
of the Settlement Agreement

(R. 104-106) is attached as

Addendum Exhibit "E". A copy of the Promissory Note (R. 108109) is attached as Addendum Exhibit "F".
The

Settlement

Agreement

and

Promissory

Note

were

intended to pay and discharge all liability of Gump & Ayers
for lease payments that had accrued through November, 1988,
together with an amount in excess of accrued lease payments in
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settlement of liability for future lease payments accruing on
the vacant premises (Floor Affidavit, para. 8, R. 192).
The accrued lease payments to November, 1988, totaled
$52,613.82, (Floor Affidavit, para. 15, R. 194-195).

The

Settlement Agreement provided for the payment of $20,000 in
cash (paid in two installments) in addition to the Promissory
Note in the principal sum of $55,000 (Lloyd Affidavit, para.
18, R. 56-57).
amount

was

Thus, the sum of $22,386.18 of the settlement

attributable

to

compromising

Gump

& Ayers1

liability for future lease payments ($75,000 - $52,613.82 =
$22,386.18) (Floor Affidavit, para. 15, R. 194-195).
In negotiating the Settlement Agreement and Promissory
Note, Gump & Ayers relied on the statements by Union Park that
the premises remained vacant and the no prospective tenant had
been located. This reliance prompted Gump & Ayers to agree to
pay the $22,386.18 in excess of rental payments that had
accrued to the date of the agreement (Floor Affidavit, paras.
9, R. 192).
After commencement of the instant litigation, Gump &
Ayers learned that the subject premises had been leased to
Matrix on November 23, 1988, two weeks prior to the date of
the Settlement Agreement and Promissory Note (Floor Affidavit,
para. 18, R. 195-196; Lloyd Affidavit, para. 28 (R. 60). The
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Lease Agreement between Union Park and Matrix, bearing the
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conclusory statements1 to persuade the lower court that the
fruits of its fraud should be ignored inasmuch as Union Park's
losses in re-letting the premises to Matrix
fruits of the fraud.

exceeded the

(See footnote 1).

This unsupported legal proposition that a perpetrator of
fraud may justify the fraud upon a showing (to the extent
conclusory

statements

constitute

a

"showing") of

losses

sustained by the fraudulent scheme was accepted by the lower
court.

See Transcript of Judge's ruling on January 10, 1992,

(R. 436-448).

A copy of the ruling is attached as Addendum

Exhibit "A".
FACTS RELEVANT TO MOTION TO AMEND
TO ASSERT FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT
On or about February 14, 1990, Jerry Floor (CEO of Gump
& Ayers) attended a social gathering also attended by an

1

Union Park claimed that it was "forced" to agree with
Matrix to relet the subject premises at a lower rental (Lloyd
Affidavit, para. 28, R. 60) and that Union Park was "forced"
to incur $18,559 for leasehold improvements on the subject
premises (Lloyd Affidavit, para. 30, R. 60). On the basis of
these conclusory statements, with no evidence as to the
reasonable rental value of the premises, no evidence as to the
reasonableness and necessity for the leasehold improvements,
and with no deduction for the increase in the value of its
asset by reason of the leasehold improvements, Union Park
asserted losses of $50,665.41 in excess of the $75,000 it
received from Gump & Ayers. (Lloyd Affidavit, para. 32, R.
61-62). There was no allowance for the enhanced value of
Union Park's property (which would be realized at the
termination of the lease) with respect to the capital
improvements.
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inducement was not asserted as a defense. However, the Answer
did contain the following:
Defendant reserves the right to conduct
discovery to determine if the Promissory
Note was procured by fraud. In the event
discovery produces evidence of fraud,
Defendant reserves the right to amend
this Answer to assert fraud in the
inducement. (R. 16).
On or about February 25, 1991, Gump & Ayers received a
copy of the Lease Agreement between Union Park Associates and
Matrix with respect to the subject premises

(hereinafter

"Matrix Lease") (Lloyd Affidavit, Exhibit E, R. 135-155).
The Matrix Lease was dated November 22, 1988, more than
two weeks prior to the Settlement Agreement and Promissory
Note.

The Matrix Lease involved 10,039 square feet which

included the subject premises (Lloyd Affidavit, para. 28 (R.
60); Exhibit "E" (R. 135).
premises were extended.

Shortly thereafter the leased

(R. 156-157).

Inasmuch as the Matrix Lease established that the subject
premises had been leased prior to the Promissory Note and
Settlement Agreement, the claim of fraud in the inducement of
the Settlement Agreement and Promissory Note was sufficiently
corroborated

thereby

justifying

Defendant's

counsel

in

formally asserting the defense of fraud in the inducement.
On March 21, 1992, Gump & Ayers filed a Motion to Amend
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FACTS RELEVANT T O INTEREST R A T E
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i.
The Promissory Note prepared by Union Park contained the

following provisions with respect to interest:
1

' Gump & Ayers1 Motion to Amend was initially granted on
the grounds that Union Park had not opposed the Motion (R.
402).
However, Union Park sought relief from the Order
granting leave noting its opposition had been overlooked by
the lower court (R, 404). The Order granting Gump & Ayers
leave to amend was vacated on September 17, 1991, and the
court stated it would reconsider the motion at a later date
(R. 431). The Motion to Amend was later denied as noted in
the text (R. 435; 470).
14

i:J: I = •

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned
hereby promises to pay to the order of
UNION PARK ASSOCIATES, 6925 Union Park
Center, Suite 500, Midvale, Utah 84047,
the sum of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND AND NO/100
DOLLARS ($55,000). This Note shall bear
interest at the rate of ten percent (10%)
from and after May 1, 1988. (Emphasis
added).
(R. 108-109).
See Addendum
Exhibit "F".
There is no wording in the Promissory Note which suggests
that the specified interest rate of 10% was a "per annum"
rate.
The Order and Judgment dated December 16, 1992, denied
Gump & Ayers cross motion for summary judgment seeking a
declaration that the interest on the Promissory Note is a flat
rate of 10% rather than a per annum rate.

(R. 606-608).

(Copy of Order is included in Addendum).
The final judgment dated December 16, 1992, granted
Plaintiff interest computed at 10% per annum.

See Transcript

of ruling, R. 743-748, Addendum Exhibit "B". In entering the
judgment, the lower court relied solely upon the wording of
the

Promissory

evidence.

Note

without

consideration

of

extrinsic

Transcript of ruling (R. 744), Addendum Exhibit

"B".
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I:

At the time Gump & Ayers filed its Answer, it

suspected it had been induced to execute the Promissory Note
15

and Settlement Agreement (.:•:-. the basis of fraudulent statements
]

^owe vet-

hearsay statements u^iu Uit statements had been denied by Union
Park,

Gump

refrained

from

assertino

fraud

in

compli ance i;
the facts confirming : ;.t existence OL i; -. .*. w^ie aiscuvcied,
Gump

»vers

moved

(

i I

Motioi

to

am*-''d
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£• * ^ r

and

asser

•

Ayers asserts that such denial was an abuse of

discretion.
1

i

for Summary

udgment on

i :u

issue

liability

under the

Promissory Note despite p"H° n fe that the Dromissory Nc4-^ ^Tac:

erred in granting summary judgment on

iability ; :\ the face of

evidence that established the promissory Note was procured by
f rai id»

POINT III:

The Promissory Note, drafted : } (ir.iu:. Park

and its attorneys, provi ded f~
percent

j

(10%) from and after Ma\

mention of a "per annum" rate of interest.

. .

«,,.- . ..

In Its Complaint,

Union Park
"per annum"

.- ,

,^

,AH= riuiii±.ssor> ^ute.

Gump & Ayers

asserts that the lower court erred in granting judgment which
included interest at the rate of 10% per annum,
POINT IV:

By reason of the wording of the Promissory

Note stated under POINT III, Gump & Ayers asserts that the
lower court erred in denying Gump & Ayers1 Motion for Summary
Judgment seeking a declaration of a flat rate of interest
under the Promissory Note.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING GUMP & AYERS1 MOTION TO AMEND ITS ANSWER
AND TO ASSERT A COUNTERCLAIM BASED ON FRAUD.
As noted in the Statement of Facts, on December 7, 1988,
Gump

&

Ayers

entered

into

a

Settlement

Agreement

and

Promissory Note for the purpose of compromising Gump & Ayers1
liability under prior leases of office space wherein Gump &
Ayers was lessee and Union Park was lessor.
At all times prior to the execution of the Settlement
Agreement and Promissory Note, Union Park had represented that
the subject premises remained vacant with no prospects for a
replacement tenant.

Such statement was false, and was known

to be
false at the time it was made, inasmuch as Matrix had leased
the subject premises from Union Park two weeks earlier.
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he has read the pleading, motion, or
other paper; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact . . . and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such
as to harass or cause unnecessary delay
or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. (Emphasis added).
In

its

Answer

to

the

Complaint,

based

upon

the

information provided by Gump & Ayers, counsel for Gump & Ayers
reserved his right to amend the Answer to assert fraud,
stating:
Defendant reserves the right to conduct
discovery to determine if the Promissory
Note was procured by fraud. In the event
discovery produces evidence of fraud,
Defendant reserves
the right to amend this Answer to assert
fraud in the inducement.
As the case progressed, Gump & Ayers obtained a copy of
the lease between Union Park and Matrix describing the subject
premises.

The document clearly established that the subject

premises had been leased to Matrix on November 23, 1988, two
weeks prior to the Promissory Note and Settlement Agreement.3
On March 21, 1992, Gump & Ayers filed a Motion to Amend
its Answer to assert a counterclaim alleging the fraud which
was now confirmed.

During the course of the hearing on

3

Gump & Ayers has not been able to determine if Matrix
occupied the premises prior to the date of the written lease
as stated by its employee.
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January :

* he low*,-: court denied the Motion to Amend,

25, 1992.
The denial of the Motion effectively removed all evidence
c
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with Rule ,11 „ The ruling in the instant; c.: t-i is tantamount to
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The Transcript of 1: .1: u i Court"s ruling (R. 436-448,
Appendix Exhibit "A") indicates the lower court gave
consideration to the evidence supporting the fraud defense and
appeared to rule that the fraud was either not material or was
not sufficiently established. It is difficult to determine
whether the denial of the Motion to Amend prevented close
consideration of the evidence in support of the fraud defense,
materially influenced consideration of such evidence or had no
effect whatsoever in considering the evidence.
However,
inasmuch as the Motion to Amend was denied, it is presumed
that the evidence of fraud was not seriously considered by the
court. In any event, any comment on the evidence establishing
fraud was dictum. Regardless of the impact on defenses to the
Complaint, the counterclaim should have been granted which
would preclude a final summary judgment •'•• " K ^ matter.

a penalty against Gump & Ayers for its good faith compliance
with Rule 11.
It is apparent that if Gump & Ayers had asserted fraud on
the basis of the unconfirmed statement of the employee, and no
fraud
had been found to exist, Gump & Ayers and its counsel would be
defending a Rule 11 motion in this action.
This impossible dilemma imposed by the lower court should
be removed by this Court by reversing the order of the trial
court and mandating that amendments which are timely asserted
after the parties comply with Rule 11 should be freely
granted.
It

should

further

be

noted,

apart

from

Rule

11

considerations, that at the time of the Motion to Amend was
filed, discovery was uncompleted and no trial date had been
established in the action.

Thus, there was no basis to deny

the Motion to Amend. In Rinawood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc.,
786 P.2d 1350 (Utah Ct. App.), Cert. Denied, 795 P.2d 1138
(Utah 1990), this Court held:
In
considering
motions
to
amend
pleadings, primary considerations are
whether the parties have adequate notice
to meet new issues and whether any party
receives
an
unfair
advantage
or
disadvantage. Accord, Bekins Bar V Ranch
v, Huth, 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983).
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It is respectfully submitted that the Order denying Gump
& Ayers1 Motion to Amend should be reversed, and the case
remanded to the trial court so that the issues of fraud can be
addressed by way of defense and counterclaim in connection
with the issues relating to liability under the Settlement
Agreement and Promissory Note.
POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WHEN FACTS BEFORE THE COURT ESTABLISHED FRAUD IN
CONNECTION WITH THE EXECUTION OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE.
As noted in the Statement of Facts, Gump & Ayers was
induced

to

execute

the

Promissory

Note

and

Settlement

Agreement in reliance on statements by Union Park that the
subject premises remained vacant with no prospects for a
replacement

tenant.

The

facts before

the

lower

court

established that such representations were false and were
known to be false at the time they were made.
The amount of rent that had accrued to the date of the
execution of the Settlement Agreement and Promissory Note was
$52,613.82 (Floor Affidavit, para. 15, R. 194-195).

The

Settlement Agreement provided for the payment of $20,000 in
cash (paid in two installments) in addition to the Promissory
Note in the principal sum of $55,000 (Lloyd Affidavit, para.
18, R. 56-57).

Thus, in reliance on the representations of
22

Union Park, Gump & Ayers was induced to agree to pay a total
of $75,000 which was $22,386.15 in excess of the rents accrued
to the date of the execution of the Settlement Agreement and
Promissory Note ($75,000 - $52,613.82 = $22,386.15).

It is readily apparent that if Gump & Ayers had known
that the subject premises had already been leased to a
replacement tenant, it would not have agreed to pay funds in
excess of the rents accrued to the date of the Settlement
Agreement and Promissory Note.
A promissory note which is procured by fraud is voidable
at the option of the person defrauded. Suaarhouse Finance Co.
v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1980); 37 Am. Jur. 2nd, Fraud
and Deceit, § 8; State Insurance Fund v. Brooks, 755 P.2d 653
(Okla. 1988).

Kaus v. Privette, 529 P.2d 23 (Wash. App.

1974); Havas v. Alaer, 461 P.2d 857 (Nev. 1969); Terrill v.
Laney, 193 P.2d 296 (Okla. 1948); Dahl v. Crain, 237 P.2d 939
(Ore. 1951).

Moreover, the existence of fraud and related

issues are questions of fact which must be resolved by the
jury.

Berkeley Bank v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798 (Utah 1984);

Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, Inc., 557 Pl2d 1009 (Utah
1976).
In the lower court, Union Park attempted to circumvent
the fraud allegations by asserting that the fraudulent scheme
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should be ignored because the fruits of the fraud were
overcome by losses in connection with the lease to Matrix. In
this regard, Union Park asserted it was "forced" to re-let the
premises to Matrix at a lower rental (R. 60) and that it was
"forced" to incur $18,559 for leasehold improvements (R. 60),
thereby making its fraud immaterial.
conclusory

statements, Union

Park

On the basis of these
claimed

that

it lost

$50,656.41 in excess of the $75,000 it received from Gump &
Ayers (Lloyd Affidavit, para. 28-32, R. 60-63).

It appears

the trial court accepted these conclusory statements as a
basis for ruling that the fraud on the part of Union Park was
not material.

See Transcript of Judge's ruling (R. 436-448)

Addendum Exhibit "A".
The acceptance by the trial court of these conclusory
statements

was

erroneous.

Conclusory

statements

are

insufficient to support a summary judgment. Walker v. Rocky
Mountain

Recreation

Company f

508 P.2d

538

(Utah

1973);

Albrecht v. Uranium Services, Inc.. 596 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1979).
Furthermore, there is no authority in support of an argument
that the fruits of fraud should be ignored when other "losses"
exceed the fruits of the fraud.
contrary to public policy.
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Such a ruling is clearly

Even if the conclusory statements asserted by Union Park
could

be considered

in ruling on a motion

for summary

judgment, the lower court still committed error in granting
the summary judgment motion on the basis of such statements
inasmuch

as

all

of

the

elements

of

fraud,

including

materiality of the fraud, are factual questions that should be
resolved by a jury.

Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, Inc.,

557 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1976); Berkeley Bank v. Meibos, 607 P.2d
798 (Utah 1984); Lewis v. White, 269 P.2d 865 (Utah 1954).
The conclusory statements that Union Park was "forced" to
lease the subject premises at a lower rent and "forced" to
make capital improvements were addressed in Interrogatories
served

on

Union

Park.

Union

Park's

Answers

to

the

Interrogatories revealed that the conclusory statements were
based on other conclusory and self-serving statements giving
rise

to

a myriad

of

factual

issues.

See Answers

Interrogatories Nos. 3 and 4, Addendum Exhibit "G".

to

It is

apparent that Union Park has not established the claimed
"losses" sufficiently to satisfy the requirements of a summary
judgment procedure. Frederick May & Company v. Dunn, 368 P.2d
266 (Utah 1962).
There were

no

facts before

the

lower

court which

supported the conclusion that Union Park was "forced" to re-
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let the premises at a lower rate or that it was "forced" to
provide capital improvements.

Furthermore, Union Park has

failed and refused to rebut claims that it has affiliations
with Matrix,5 thereby providing an opportunity and incentive
for less-than-arms-length-dealings with respect to reduced
rents and capital improvements.
The Order of August 25, 1992, should be reversed and the
case remanded to the lower court to conduct a trial wherein
the defense and claims of fraud will be considered in
connection with Gump & Ayers1 liability under the Settlement
Agreement and Promissory Note.
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FOR "PER ANNUM" INTEREST UNDER THE PROMISSORY NOTE.
As noted in the Statement of Facts, the Promissory Note
executed by Gump & Ayers in favor of Union Park provided as
follows:
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned
hereby promises to pay to the order of
UNION PARK ASSOCIATES, 6925 Union Park
5

In opposing Union Park's first summary judgment
motion, Gump & Ayers asserted that Union Park and Matrix were
affiliated (R. 195). Thereafter, in written discovery, Gump
& Ayers attempted to confirm such fact (Appendix Exhibit "G",
Interrogatory No. 5). Union Park objected to the inquiry.
(Ibid). The affidavits filed by Union Park in support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment did not deny the claim of
affiliation.
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Center, Suite 500, Midvale, Utah 84047,
the sum of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND AND NO/100
DOLLARS ($55,000). This note shall bear
interest at the rate of ten percent (10%)
from and after May 1, 1988. (Emphasis
added).
The evidence established that Union Park's attorney
unilaterally drafted the provisions of the Promissory Note.
It is apparent that if Union Park had intended the interest
rate to be "per annum" rate, Union Park could easily have
inserted the appropriate wording.

The wording selected by

Plaintiff clearly specifies a "flat" interest rate to be
charged "from and after May 1, 1988."
The lower court held that the wording of the Promissory
Note was unambiguous and granted Union Park's summary judgment
without consideration of extrinsic evidence submitted by both
parties.

Transcript of Court's ruling on November 30, 1992

(R. 743-748), Addendum Exhibit "B"6.

6

Neither party has

On page 4 of the Transcript (R. 746, lines 19-23),
counsel for Gump & Ayers attempted to confirm that the court
did not refer to extrinsic evidence on the interest question.
However, it appears there is an error in the Transcript. Gump
& Ayers believes that the words "this decision was made out of
the consideration of the extrinsic evidence" should have been
"this decision was made without consideration of the
extrinsic." Gump & Ayers has requested the reporter to review
her notes with respect to this aspect of the Transcript. At
the time of the filing of this Brief, the reporter had not
completed the review. In the event the error is confirmed by
the reporter, Gump & Ayers refers the Court to the corrected
Transcript.
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challenged that aspect of the lower court's ruling. Thus, the
issue before this Court, with respect to the interest rate, is
determined on the basis of the above-quoted language of the
Promissory Note.
Gump & Ayers respectfully submits that the wording of the
Promissory Note is clear and unambiguous and compels the
conclusion that the interest rate of ten percent (10%) is a
"flat rate" and there is no justification for inserting the
words "per annum" into the wording of the Note.
It is readily apparent that the decision of the lower
court to re-write the Promissory Note to insert the words "per
annum" into the paragraph relating to interest was contrary to
the basic principles of contract law.
In Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d
743 (Utah 1982), the Supreme Court of the State of Utah held:
When a question arises regarding a
written instrument, the first source of
inquiry must be the document itself,
considered in its entirety. . . . It is
a long-standing rule in Utah that persons
dealing at arm's length are entitled to
contract on their own terms without the
intervention of the courts to relieve
either party from the effects of a bad
bargain . . .
This court will not
rewrite a contract simply to supply terms
which the parties omitted.
(Emphasis
added).
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The only basis upon which a court should involve itself
in altering or amending the terms and provisions of a written
contract is when the party pleads and establishes a cause of
action for reformation. Thompson v. Smith, 620 P.2d 520 (Utah
1980); Hottinaer v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1984). Union
Park has not
pled a claim for reformation nor has Union Park established a
basis for reformation.
In order for Union Park to establish grounds to add the
words

"per

annum"

to

the

terms and

provisions

of

the

Promissory Note, it must plead and establish the following:
There
are
two basic
grounds
for
reformation of written instruments which
do not correctly state and embody the
intention and pre-existing agreement of
the parties to the instrument, namely,
(1) mutual mistake of the parties and (2)
ignorance or mistake of the complaining
party coupled with or induced by the
fraud or inequitable conduct of the other
remaining parties. I Thompson v. Smith,
supra at p. 523).
In this action Union Park has not pled or even suggested
mutual mistake of fact or fraud on the part of Gump & Ayers.
Moreover, inasmuch as Union Park drafted the Promissory Note,
there is no possibility that Defendant fraudulently omitted
the words "per annum" from the Promissory Note.

29

In the absence of a reformation claim and the failure to
establish any grounds for reformation, there is no basis for
the Court to rewrite the Promissory Note to provide for per
annum interest.
One of the grounds for the lower court's decision to
include per annum interest in the Judgment, was the provisions
of Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-3, which provide as follows:
Whenever in any statute or deed, or
written or verbal contract, or in any
public or private instrument whatever,
any certain rate of interest is mentioned
and no period of time is stated, interest
shall be calculated at the rate mentioned
by the year.
It is readily apparent that the statute is not available
to amend the provisions of the Promissory Note which Union
Park prepared.

The statute addresses a situation where "no

time is stated."

In this regard, the subject Note clearly

states a time period, i.e., "ten percent (10%) from and after
May 1, 1988."
Accordingly, the statute does not permit the Court to
rewrite the Promissory Note to insert provisions which Union
Park chose to omit when it prepared the Promissory Note.
The Order and Judgment of December 16, 1992, should be
reversed with a determination by this Court that the interest
rate stated in the Promissory Note is a flat rate of ten
30

percent (10%) applicable to the period commencing on the date
the Note was executed to the date the last installment payment
was due and payable, with interest at the statutory rate
thereafter.
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING GUMP & AYERS1 MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE INTEREST RATE
On October 1, 1992, Gump & Ayers filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment seeking a ruling that its obligations under
the Promissory Note were limited to a "flat" interest rate of
ten percent (10%) rather than a "per annum" rate.

(R. 566).

In this regard, the flat six percent (6%) rate should be
applicable to the period commencing on the date the Note was
executed and ending on the date the last installment was due
and payable, with statutory interest thereafter.

The Order

and Judgment of December 16, 1992, denied the Motion (R. 606608, Addendum Exhibit "D").
On the basis of the wording of the Promissory Note and
the authorities cited under Point III of this Brief, Gump &
Ayers asserts that the lower court erred in denying the Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment and that the Order and Judgment
should be reversed thereby establishing the flat interest rate
stated in the Promissory Note.
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CONCLUSION
The denial of Gump & Ayers1 Motion to Amend its Answer
and to assert a counterclaim imposed a penalty on Gump & Ayers
and its attorney for its good faith attempts to comply with
the provisions of Rule 11.

The Order of August 25, 1992,

denying Gump & Ayers Motion to Amend should be reversed and
the case remanded for trial on the issues raised by the
proposed answer and counterclaim.
The Order of August 25, 1992, granting summary judgment
on

the

issue

of

liability

under

the

Promissory

Note

constituted an error in law by reason of the evidence that the
Promissory Note was procured by fraud.

The Order should be

reversed and the case remanded for trial so that the issue of
Union Park's fraud may be considered in connection with Gump
&

Ayers1

liability

under

the

Settlement

Agreement

and

Promissory Note.
The Order and Judgment of December 16, 1992, should be
reversed and the interest obligation established as stated in
the Promissory Note.
DATED this ]^_ day of April, 1993.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
MCPQNALD, WEST & BENSON

AplA
Robert M. McDonald
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12
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0004:io

Court

1

FRIDAY, JANUARY 10, 1992

2

JUDGE'S RULING

3

THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you, counsel.

I

4

appreciate your arguments and the thoroughness in which you

5

presented this this afternoon.

6

as I told you before, I have read the memoranda and

1

voluminous pleadings that have been submitted on this case.

8
9

I have considered this and,

This is the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment to enforce a settlement agreement that was entered

10

into by the parties at the time that the defendant terminate^

11

the lease unilaterally.

12

claim considerable thought.

13

any misrepresentations were made, that under these facts the

14

defendant has not shown by clear and convincing evidence

15

that the misrepresentations were material for the reasons

16

argued by the plaintiff's counsel, but here and in its

Frankly, I have given the fraud
I am frankly persuaded that if

17 I pleadings.
18

This is a rather unusual kind of a ruling, I think

19 J in these kinds of actions but there is a burden on the
20 I defendant to show by clear and convincing evidence that
21

fraudulent misrepresentations were made or omissions in the

22

face of the duty to speak.

23

were misrepresentations, but there is some evidence to the

24 J contrary.

I am not convinced that there

And so on that point, plaintiffs would not be

25 I entitled to summary judgment alone.

But it seems to me
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that that, under all of the facts, including the contractual
obligations which the defendants submit they did owe at
that time, both having already accrued and what they were
exposed to, and in light of the damages amounts that the
plaintiffs did suffer as a result of the termination of
the lease, and cost associated with re-letting, and all of
that, when you look at all of the numbers that are involved,
I just don't see this as material.

I don't think that the

defendants have met their burden of showing by clear and
convincing evidence that there was fraud in the inducement
in this action.

For that reason then, I am not inclined

to accord that view and would rather on the issue of
liability grant summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Now, there are contested issues as to the amount
of interest owing, whether it is ten percent or ten percent
per annum; and we haven't addressed that today.

Also, if

there is any dispute about attorney's fees, we will need to
deal with that as well.

So, counsel, I would like you to

address the issue of damages at this time, procedurally,
just how you would like the Court to resolve that,
MR. SWAN:

Well, to be frank, Your Honor, I have

not done any legal analysis of construction of interest
rates when it is not -- when the phrase "per annum" is not
set forth in the note.

It would be my suspicion because of

my practice, and I do this quite a bit, that that is a
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phrase or an understanding of the note that the Court can
infer, otherwise it is not sensical.
some kind of period.

Calculate interest on

And I think we can show by the way

that the defendants were calculating their own payments
and by their own affidavit, they show how much they were
paying.

They were calculating it on a per annum basis.

For instance, they owed their first payment so many months
after the execution of the note.

They paid the principal

amount due, plus the accrued interest portion and that
calculation is quite simple.
is what they were using.

It was ten percent per annum

And so, I think that there is a

clear showing by the conduct of the parties that there was
a meeting of the minds that that meant a yearly basis.
If the Court would like me to brief how the Court
is supposed to construe that, I can do the calculation right
here and show you that that is how they construed it themselves based upon their own affidavit.
THE COURT:

I don ! t know that we are going to get

this issue resolved today and I don't know on what other
points the defendants might disagree with the amount of
damages.

I think the better way to handle this, unless

Mr. Mc Donald has got a better idea, is to submit your
judgment on the issue of liability and set forth the amount
of damages.

And if Mr. Mc Donald objects to that, then we

can have a hearing on that.

Unless, Mr. Mc Donald, do you
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have another suggestion?
MR. MC DONALD:

The problem that I have, Your Honor

and it is inherent in the ruling that has been made by the
Court and that is this:

that the case has been presented

as a case for summary judgment on a note.

It has been

decided on the basis of something that I didn't regard as
being an issue and that was their calculations of what would
be due without the note.
to be addressed.

That isn't an issue that was raisedj

There were substantial factual disputes

with the manner in which they claimed this.

When you say

there is only 3,000 in dispute -THE COURT:

No, no.

I am not talking about that.

I am not talking about the amount of the note itself.

The

issues that I really see that remain unresolved as to
damages, are the interest figure, attorney's fees and costs
I don't see, you know, the basic underlying amount of the
promissory note as remaining at issue.
MR. MC DONALD:
decisions, it is not.
guess maybe --

Well, in light of the Court's

The problem I had with it is, and I

now that I hear the Court's basis for

non-materiality, it is based upon a finding that their
calculation of what would be due without the note are
correct.
THE COURT:

That I used as an overall context.

However, my ruling, my finding, was assuming there were
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misrepresentations that were made, they are not material to
the promissory note and the negotiations of the promissory
note.

And I find that because I felt that the defendants

has by law the burden of proof, rather heavy burden of
proof to show by clear and convincing evidence that they
were in fact material, and I didn't see that that burden
had been met.
Now the only issues that I do see that remain to
be resolved are whether the interest was per annum and as
to that, I didn't focus on that as we prepared here today.
But there is obviously contention about who drafted this
note and therefore, you know, this may come down to a ruling
of construction, you know, as to who drafted the note and
whether it was ten percent or
MR. MC DONALD:
THE COURT:

—

It is parol evidence.

Maybe it is parol evidence, but I

think that that issue is an issue that remains in my mind
and then the issue of attorney's fees and costs.

Those are

the only issues that I see that remain.
MR. MC DONALD:

Well, I can't conceive of how we

can resolve those issues on summary judgment.
can attempt.

So maybe we

I will certainly attempt to resolve this in

light of the Court's ruling so we don't have to come back,
but I can't conceive of how we can in this circumstance
start resolving factual disputes.

UUO'Mi

1

THE COURT:

Well, I am just looking for a procedural

2

mechanism in which to resolve it.

3

is something that is reserved for trial because it can f t

4

be resolved

5

is the way it will come out.

6

summary-"fashion

That is all.

And if it

Ml -MI H M I ^ * ill hem-inm

that

However, I would like to address at least a couple

7

of the other motions.

£

damages, I am granting summary judgment on the issue of

9 I i-abilitv

I think with regard to the issue of

.-.->.

'aintiff's motion.

I am not

IQ

resolving today, I am not ruling on the issue, deciding one

11

way or the other on the issue of damages.

12

remains alive.

13

issue of damages, attorney's fees and costs, then you may do

14

so, or if you are not able to resolve that by discussions

15

between I In

1C

for trial if no motion is filed.

17

I

And that issue

If \ i v* M M I ! < » innlM" .1 s p e c i f i c m o t . i o n <»n t h e

I

mi

u! IHM vmi ,.-)«

i I in

nt- idnred pi I ? P P P red

And with regard to the other pending motions, as

111

to the Motion to Amend, implicit _L

19

would deny the Motion to Amend to allege a counterclaim

20

setting forth fraud as a cause of action.
MR. Ml DONALD:

21
22
23

You are denying the Motion to

Amend?
THE COURT:

That is correct, and in so doing I

24

don f t find that it was unreasonably -- or rather, that it

25

was untimely.

I think that it was early enough in the

C

m

•*

*" #

lawsuit, but rather I looked to the substantive issue of
fraud and it doesn't make any sense to me that having found
that -- I don't see that when the issue has been framed as
to the claims of fraud, that there has been clear and
convincing evidence to show, that it would make sense then
to turn around and say, "Okay, now, amend your Answer and
include the counterclaim on this very issue that I just said
wasn't clear and convincing at this point."

That is why

I am denying the Motion to Amend.
MR. MC DONALD:

The problem I have, if the Motion

to Amend is not granted, then fraud isn't before the Court
on summary judgment.
MR. SWAN:

It is in the way of the affirmative

defense on how to defend a motion.
THE COURT:

Well, you defend it on that basis and

I considered it in that context.

It was a pending motion

I reserved on that.

I indicated I had read all of the

pleadings about it.

Motion to Amend is denied.

Now, are there any other motions that we need to
deal with today?
MR. MC DONALD:

I think the others would be moot

now.
MR. SWAN:

I believe so, Your Honor.

The Motion

to Strike the Affidavit of John Parsons, that was submitted
in the support of their opposition memorandum.

Our motion

000443

1

for Protective Order is probably moot since there is no

2

need for discovery.

3

answei: ed 11 ia 1: discovery belatedly II: : • t::i : }

4

cleaned up and maybe settle this case.

Just so the Court knows, we have
t: : g€ • 1: 1:1 :t i s i

So it was made moot

by our own response to their discovery except for maybe theijr
response f;

ttorney ' ,
* •, Urn ,-

I Him I I now.

Motion to compel, I think that is made moot.

They]

had a Motion to Strike our supplemental affidavits and I
think the Court has allowed those appendix Irnplicit in its
ruling and been willing to consider those.

THE COURT:

Very well.

I think those

Is there anything else

then, counsel?
MR. 1 1.c D0MAI ,D :

W i 1 1 } : I prepare ai 0rder?

(Talking to Mr. Swan.)
THE COURT:

Yes.

Mr. Swan, I want you to prepare

a j udgmen 1: ai Id 0rder in accordance w :I t: 1: I 1:1 ie i: it 11 i i Ig I:his
afternoon, and do you need a scheduling in case?
MR. SWAN:
THE COURT:

For a trial?
No, I would

Just in terms of a discovery cut-off, if you are not
completed and cut-off for any other motions.
MR. SWAN ::: \ 1 E; J 11

:i t: w o \ :i ] c:i b e i i} 1 Iope 11 i a t based

upon this Courtfs ruling of liability, that Mr. McDonald
and I can get together and resolve this issue on damages.

8

00044 4
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2
3
4
5

If his client still wants to fight, then maybe we will do
those.

I don't know what the position is going to be.
THE COURT: Why don't you do this--

Oh, go ahead,

Mr. Mc Donald.
MR. MC DONALD:

Why don't we address that?

6

Obviously, neither of us

7

in the new context of the case.

8

in fact we are unable to agree and you think it is a

9

summary judgment issue, we should file a supplemental or

10

a different motion so we can now address what we didn't

11

know we were going to have to address today.

12

meantime, we will attempt to resolve it in light of the

13

Court's ruling reserving all appeal rights and so forth

14

so we can bring it to a conclusion.

15
16
17
18
19

THE COURT:

have had an opportunity to think
I would suggest that if

Well, do you see the need to do any

additional discovery or you are just not prepared to
analyze that?
MR. MC DONALD:

Well, I don't think we will know

that until we can determine whether we can resolve the

20

damage issue.

21

case is over unless there is an appeal filed.

22

In the

If the damage issue can be resolved, the

THE COURT:

Why don't you do this.

If you see

23

the need for -- if you are not able to resolve it satis-

24
25

factory between yourselves, then why don't you on or befor
December 31st to file a proposed scheduling --

.4

.«•

—"

0 0 0 4 4,}

1

MR. MC DONALD

ou mean January?

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. MC DONALD:

4

THE COURT:

What did I say?
December.

I am looking at January

5

December.

File by January 31st a proposed schedule and

6

,il ' '

1

about two weeks after that a motion - - a cut-off for any

8

other dispositive motions you might have.

9

week after that, if r

' '

i

" ..I

i that is discovery cut-off and

And about a

dispositive motions H T P filed, fhein

10

a date by which one of you would file a Certification .

11

Readiness for Trial.

12

a scheduling conference and schea., - a f:i i lal pretrial

13

trial.

14

In other words, if you can't resolve it otherwise.

But don't do that unless you find it necessary.

15

MR. SWAN .

16
1

And at that point, then we will na\ • i

">ne of my concerns , £our I Ic 'i IC i: , i s I

am going to -- cause I don't take as copious of notes as
j

'
19

I

i ii ill J ^n you rule, I am probably going to require a

transcript of the ruling portion of this hearina,
make sure I have got everything in the Order.

20
21 I

long it will take to get something in order to
present something to Mr. Mc Donald.

22

THE REPORTER:

23 I

THE COURT:

24

MR. SWAN:

25

I don't

I can do it right away.

Dorothy says she can do it right away
Then we should be able to meet that

deadline.

10

0U044G

'

THE COURT:

*

If you can, fine.

about January 31st as I am if you —

I am not so concernep

if you are not able to

* J resolve it, then let's get a scheduling in place and then we
can get this matter resolved.
MR. MC DONALD:

In light of the unknown, why don't

we just have it at such a time as we find we are unable to
negotiate, if we can.
8

We will just file for a scheduling

conference and will go from there.

o
?

10
11

12
13

I

MR. SWAN:

My anticipation if we can't agree on

this interest rate issue, then I will file a Motion for
Summary Judgment on that issue.

I am pretty confident I

think I know what the law is.
THE COURT:

14

All right.

The final ruling will be

15

this, in order to give you a little more time, if you are

16

not able to resolve this then by February 14th, and that is

17

more than a month down the road, if you are not able to

18

resolve it by then, then submit a proposed schedule if you

19

can agree on one. Okay?
MR. MC DONALD:

20
21

Otherwise, move for a scheduling

conference?
THE COURT:

22
23

one.

24

that.

25

done.

Well, no, just submit your respective

I don f t think we need to have another hearing about
I am just looking for the easiest way to get that
MR. MC DONALD:
THE COURT:

All right, thank you, Your Honor.

Thank you.
* * * * *
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

2 J STATE OF UTAH

)
ss

3 | COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
4
5 I

I, DOROTHY L. TRIPP, C.S.R., do hereby certify:

6

That I am one of the Official Court Reporters

7

of the Third District Court of the State of Utah.

8
9

That on Friday, January 10, 1992, I reported the
testini "

<

]|

proceedings, to the best of my ability

10

on said date in the above-entitled matter, presided

11

by the Honorable Anne M. Stirba in the Third District

1

er

t Lake County, State of Utal:I; and that the

13

foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to .., inclusive, contain

14

a full, true and correct account of said proceedings of

1

Judge's Ruling to 11 Ie best : f i i i;\,. i Ii Iderstand

16

and ability on said date.

1

17
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I9

22
23
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1

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 3 0 .

2

J U D G E ' S

1 9 9 2 : P.M.

B E N C H

SESSION

R U L I N G

3

THE COURT:

4

Thank you, counsel.

5

I reviewed the motions and all the memoranda that

6

have been submitted and the affidavits, and I am prepared to

7

rule at this time on the motions.

8

the Court:

9

partial motion or a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the

10

There are two motions before

The Plaintiff's Motion for what is essentially a

Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

11

The specific issue first to be resolved is the

12

construction of the interest rate in the promissory note.

13

parties to a contract such as this are not entitled to a better

14

contract than the one that they entered into.

15

that, it is incumbent upon the Court to make a first

Now,

And having said

16j determination that in a contract dispute whether the underlying
17

contract, in this case the promissory note, is clear and

18

unambiguous.

19

And in this particular case, the language that is

20

relevant to the interest rate makes no mention of a per annum

21

interest rate.

22

rate either.

It doesn't make mention of a flat rate interest
I don't think there is any ambiguity about that

23, contract in and of itself, just that it's missing a term.
24

It seems to me that in looking at that, and also

25

looking at the other language, "interest to accrue," or the

000744

aceru

nguage
<_ ^.^ *^i annum interest rate.

^e contract

f

h<=» n o ^

„

-.:_.. you nave n;^ part

making reference t-o "accn

aweo uu,/ make sense ii there is a fc: annum rate,
as a matter of 1 -w

?,~A "«**• tb o r e is no mention

rate is to jje a tidt tate oi an accruing rate.

>elieve,
whether the

*i -^ wer e a

flat irate, then you might even have an ambiguous note, but
1 kill- " «» ' "i! i '(••"".in I I "«,

I lip i issue before the court.

The plaintiff :-lie,
1

.ji it! I ;•; I

!

'

statute which sets forth

ILi-i pr "ii '"» '1" 'ii

'

other documents mentioned

a - not mentioned whether a

ii a I i»

III' i i in

no rate l hat's mentioned.
II .1 I'iU,

-^

Ill I II

And I paraphrase in very rough

• I' .1 III .-•

As I look at the statute, in looking at tihis
Dromissory note, it appears to me
s wel*

•*

'if* statute does control _.. ... - -

ioes provide the Court the justif
i a contract

m

,**

i •=

for inser*

The parties are not entitled to a better

contract than the one t

ey entered into, and generally

courts do not imply terms or read terms or add terms to a
contract,

But in this case I think tine legislature has done

just that.
And therefore, for those reasons and the other
reasons set forth by Mr. Swan on behalf of the plaintitl, I am

l! going to grant partial summary judgment in favor of the
2

plaintiff and deny that aspect of summary judgment on behalf of

3

the defendant.

4

Then as to the question of late fees and attorney's

5j fees, the contract provided for the payment of late fees when
6

payments were, in fact, late-

And it appears to me as I look

7j at that, that the contract is clear and unambiguous, that late
8

fees were to apply.

And finally with regard to attorney's

9j fees, clearly attorney's fees are appropriate for enforcing the
10

rights under that promissory note.

11

has prevailed on the issues that it has advanced.

12

consistent with that provision, the Court also grants summary

13

judgment on the issue of attorney's fees.

14j

In this case the plaintiff
And

And there has not been -- well, in any event, for

15 1 those reasons I am going to grant summary judgment as prayed
§

16| for by the plaintiff and deny it as to the defendant.
17

Is there anything I have overlooked?

18

Counsel.

19

MR. McDONALD:

In preparing the order I take it that

20

we can insert that, so there is no question as to the basis of

21

the Court's decision, that this decision was made out of the

22

consideration of the extrinsic evidence.

23|

THE COURT: That is correct.
MR. SWAN: Your Honor, you have called it a partial

24

25

summary judgment.

I believe this resolves all the issues.

00074T-
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final

judgment

as

fai

;••-

t
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Judgment
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T
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f

I I i'
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-ssues.

an wider
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I O L this M o t i o n

~ prepare

a judgment

^

for

Swan.

I

Summary

consistent

w i t h all

rulings.
yen: d~ ~-4~ h~v-

Now,

* - prepare

a r g u m e n 15

, v -1

u-

• .*

found

cf fir4:

findings

-f

8;
91

I inI H I

Thai f s m y understanding,,

THE COURT:
wan

lIPM

to m o r e
^ r.: •

a r: £

** a 5:

x

1

10
. r;^

highlights

of

'.•

bases

the C:u:' 'z

•

decision.

:

:
»d

13

* .,- p r a c t i c e

141

r.

ct at

„

least

t r y i n - *.

consistent

w i t h the C o u r t " .

16>;

.„ . .

;.ose a r g u m e n t s

181

for

- .. ing can also be c o n s i d e r e d .
r.

......

of the case and in looking

oersuasive
at that n o t e and

under
that

statute.

19

MR. SWAN :

20

THE COURT:

21

(This c o n c l u d e s

22

to s a y , "and

,-

15j

•.he facts

1emember

I ' h a 11 k y o u ,

y o u r H o 11 o r .

Thank you, counsel.
the J u d g e ' s B e n c h
ic

ie

Ruling.)

ic

23|
j
2 4!
25!

0 0
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C E R T I F I C A T E
3 j STATE OP UTAH
j

4

•

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

5
6

)
)

I, SUZANNE WARNICK, CSR, RPR-CM, do certify that I am
a Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional

7| Reporter with the Certificate of Merit, and a Notary Public in
8

and for the State of Utah.

9

That at the time and place of the proceedings in the

10

foregoing matter, I appeared as the court reporter in the Third

11

Judicial District Court for the Honorable Judge Anne M. Stirba, j
I

I

!

12

and thereat reported in stenotype all of the proceedings had

13

therein.

14)

That thereafter, my said shorthand notes of the

15j Judge's Bench Ruling were transcribed by computer into the
16j foregoing pages; and that this constitutes a full, true and
17
18
19
20

correct transcript of the same.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL in Salt Lake City, Utah on
this, the 23rd day of January, 1993.

21
Suzanne Warnick, CSR, RPR-CM
22
m

23

1

24
25j My commission expires:
1 April 1995
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AUG 2 5
Court

Mark S. Swan - 3873
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
A Professional Corporation
311 South State Street
Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-8632
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Union Park Associates

USTRICT COURT !>l " n M,T I! AKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

UNION PARK ASSOCIATES
Limited Partnership,

ORDER

I "1 a I ntJ f £ ,
vs.
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC.,

Civil No. 900906725 L

Defendant.

J iicige a ni I E 1 1

Stirba

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for
hearing on January 10
11

Stirba,

one

of

1992 at 2:00 p.m. before the Honorable Anne
the

Judges

of

the

above-entitled

\^\:-t

Plaintiff, Union Park Associates, was represented by its cou:..e.
record, Mark S, Swan of the law firm Richer, Swan & Overholt, r
Defendant dump K Ayers was represented by u s

counsel of record,

Robert M. McDonald of the 1aw firm McDonald & Bullen.

The Court

having reviewed the pleadings on file herein, having heard oral

EXHIBIT
AIL-STATE LEGAL SUPPLY CO

J

0004 < C

Civil No. 900906725 CV
Judge Anne M. Stirba

argument of counsel, and for good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED & DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted

against Defendant Gump & Ayers as to liability only. The issues of
the calculation of damages and attorney's fees are reserved for
further ruling by this Court.
2.

Defendant's Motion to Amend its Answer and assert a

Counter-Claim is hereby denied with prejudice.
3.

Plaintiff's Motion

for Relief

from Order

is hereby

granted.
4.

All further Motions before this Court are deemed to be

moot based upon the Court' ^-ruling hferein.
DATED this

of July A 1992.
BY THE COURT:""-

HONORABLE 'ANNE^tf^STIRBA- 3
T h i r d D i s t r i c t iGourt J u d g e

00047i

Civil No. 900906725 CV
Judge Anne M. Stirba

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 i;iei"ei}\/ i t-L i. 1.1 j i m i l

me \<^

' Jttiy-, 1992, I «

id

a true and correct unsigned copy of the foregoing to be served upon
the following parties by placing the same in the United States
mails, postage prepaid, addressed as f
Robert M. McDonald
MCDONALD & BULLEN
The Hermes Building
455 East 500 South
Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah

. >ws:

84111

0 00472
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Salt Lake County Utah

DEC 1 :\ 1992
i&

^«>l tour

Mark S. Swan - 3873
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404
RICHER, SHAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
A Professional Corporation
311 South State Street
Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-8532
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Union Park Associates

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

UNION PARK ASSOCIATES, a Utah
Limited Partnership,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC.,

Civil No. 900906725 CV

Defendant.

Judge Anne M. Stirba

The hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came before the aboveentitled Court on November 30, 1992 at the hour

of 2:00 p.m.

Plaintiff was represented by its counsel of record, Mark S. Swan of
the

law

firm

Richer, Swan

& Overholt, P.C.

Defendant was

represented by its counsel of record, Robert M. McDonald of the law
firm McDonald, West & Benson.
Plaintiff's

Motion

for

The Court having reviewed the

Summary

Judgment

with

supporting

EXHIBIT

OO0G0G
ALL-STATE LEGAL SUPPLY CO.

Civil No. 900906725 CV
Judge Anne M. Stirba

documentation and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment with
supporting documentation, and after hearing oral argument thereon
and after being fully advised in the premises and based upon the
Court previously entering an Order of Partial Summary Judgment
which was entered on August 25, 1992 establishing the Defendant's
liability to Plaintiff, and the Court having made its ruling from
the bench, hereby orders as follows:
1•

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied with

prejudice.
2.

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issues of

the calculation of damages and attorney's fees is hereby granted.
3.

Plaintiff is awarded Judgment as against the Defendant in

the amount of $35,157.59 as of July 9, 1990 with interest accruing
thereon at the rate of 10% per annum thereafter until paid in full.
4.

Plaintiff is further awarded a Judgment against Defendant

in the sum of $110.50, representing the costs incurred herein and
the sum of $7,110.00, representing attorney's fees expended herein,
for a total of $7,220.50, plus interest thereon at the contract
rate of 10% per annum from the date of the entry of this Judgment
until paid in full.
5.

It is further

Ordered

that this Judgment

shall be

2

UuOGO t

Civil No. 900906725 CV
Judge Anne M. Stirba

augmented in the amount of costs and attorney's fees expended in
collecting said Judgment, by execution or otherwise, as shall be
established by Affidavit.
DATED thisyCKVVday of December, 1992.

^"rr"^

>

BY THE COU^Tr'"" '

HONORABL^A^NET-M. SXZRBA
Third Dis£ri^_C5)ixaffc Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the <Q^_ day of December, 1992, I
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon
the following parties by hand delivering the same, addressed as
follows:
Robert M. McDonald
MCDONALD, WEST & BENSON

Attorneys for Defendant
The Hermes Building
455 East 500 South
Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

UfodTl, J)(^Jj>k?[!nAr^
te023049.c92
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
AND
MUTUAL RELEASE OF CLAIMS
This Settlement Agreement/and Mutual Release of Claims is
entered into this 7th day ofnMQwemhsr, 1988, by and between
Union Park Associates (hereinafter, "Union Park") and Gump &
Ayers Real Estate, Inc. (hereinafter, "Gump & Ayers").
1. On June 28, 1985, Union Park, as landlord, and Gump &
Ayers, as tenant, entered into a certain Lease Agreement for the
lease of approximately 912 sq. ft- of the second floor of the
office building located at approximately 1150 East Fort Union
Boulevard, Midvale, Utah. That Lease Agreement provides for a
term of eight years and eight months. A copy of said Lease is
attached hereto as Exhibit "B"
2. On June 1, 1983, Union Park, as landlord, and Gump &
Ayers, as tenant, entered into a certain Lease Agreement for the
lease of approximately 4,567 sq. ft. of the second floor of the
office building located at approximately 1150 East Forth Union
Boulevard, Midvale, Utah. That Lease Agreement provides for a
term of ten years and eight months. A copy of said Lease is
attached hereto as Exhibit "C".
AGREEMENT AND RELEASE OF CLAIMS
In consideration of the mutual promises set forth below and
with the intent of being legally bound, the parties hereto agree
as follows:
3. Payment. Upon execution of this Agreement, (a) Gump &
Ayers will pay to Union Park the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars
($10,000); (b) on December 15, 1988, Gump & Ayers will pay to
Union Park an additional sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000);
in addition, (c) Upon the execution of this Agreement Gump &
Ayers will execute and deliver to Union Park a Promissory Note in
the form attached hereto as Exhibit "A", and will pay to Union
Park the additional sum of Fifty-Five Thousand Dollars ($55,000)
on the terms, and in the manner, set forth in said Promissory
Note.
4- Mutual General Releases. (a) For and in consideration
of the mutual covenants contained herein and other good and
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is
hereby acknowledged, Union Park, for itself, its successors and
assigns, does hereby fully and forever release, acquit and
discharge Gump & Ayers, its successors, assigns and any others
who have acted or who are acting on its behalf, from any and all
claims, demands, obligations, liabilities, causes of action or
any suits at law or equity, whether known or unknown to Union
Park, which Union Park may have against Gump & Ayers which claims
arise from any act or omission of Gump & Ayers committed prior to
the date of this Anr^mpnt. the Lease Agreements specified in .

EXHIBIT

"

Paragraphs Nos. 1 and 2, above, the occupation of the leased
premises by Gukp & Ayers and/or the use of the leased premises by
Gump & Ayers.
(b) For and in consideration of the mutual covenants
contained herein and other good and valuable consideration, the
receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, Gump &
Ayers, for itself, its successors and" assigns, does hereby fully
and forever release, acquit and discharge Union Park, its
successors, assigns and any others who have acted or who are
acting on its behalf from any and all claims, demands,
obligations, liabilities, causes of action or any suits at law or
equity, whether known or unknown to Gump & Ayers which Gump &
Ayers may have against Union Park which claims arise from any act
or omission of Union Park, the Lease Agreements specified in
paragraphs Nos. 1 and 2, above, the occupation of the leased
premises by Gump & Ayers and the use of the leased premises by
Gump & Ayers.
5. Rescission of Lease. For the consideration of the
covenants contained herein, the parties agree that the lease
agreements specified in paragraphs nos. 1 and 2, above, are
hereby mutually rescinded and that except as provided in this
agreement, both parties are hereby released from any and all
obligation contained within said lease agreements.
6. Default. In the event Gump & Ayers shall default in a
payment of $10,000.00 due on December 15, 1988 as set forth in
paragraph 3 above, such payments shall be subject to a late
charge at a rate equal to 18 percent per annum until paid. Any
default in the payment of any sum set forth in the Promissory
Note shall be subject to the late fee as set forth within the
Promissory Note. In the event either party defaults in the
performance of any term of this Agreement, the defaulting party
agrees to pay all reasonable attorney's fees and court costs
incurred by the non-defaulting party.
The mutual releases contained herein and the mutual recision
of the Lease Agreements contained herein are dependant upon the
full performance by Gump & Ayers of its obligations contained in
this Agreement and contained in the Promissory Note. In the
event Gump & Ayers defaults in any of its obligations set forth
in this Agreement or the performance of any obligation set forth
in the Promissory Note, Union Park Associates shall be entitled,
by its election, to retain all funds received prior to the
default and to either (1) its actual damages under the Lease
Agreements less all funds received under this Agreement and
Promissory Note prior to the default or (2) the full
consideration as provided in this agreement and the Promissory
Notes.
7.

Union Park and Gump & Ayers acknowledge that this
2
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compromise and release has been entered into freely and with the
advice of counsel and that no representations of fact or opinion
has been made by either party or by anyone acting in their behalf
to induce this compromise with respect to the nature of their
claims and damages,
DATED this

lT

day of Novembitf, 1988.
UNION PARK ASSOCIATES

By

<jl*M

9710^

GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC.

Id uniogump.rel
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PROMISSORY NOTE
$55,000.00
Principal Amount

December "Movombsg

7

/ 1988

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned hereby promises to pay
to the order of UNION PARK ASSOCIATES, 6925 Union Park Center,
Suite 500, Midvale, Utah 84047, the sum of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND
AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($55,000.00). This note shall bear interest
at the rate of ten percent (10%) from and after May 1, 1988.
Said sum shall be due and payable to the holder hereof in
eighteen (18) monthly payments of principal in the amount of
$3,055.55 plus accrued interest as of the date of each such
payment.
Said payments to be made as follows: Payments shall
commence on May 1, 1989 and continue thereafter, on the first day
on each successive month, through and including the month of
October, 1989. No payment shall be due for the months of
November, 1989 through April, 1990. Thereafter, payments shall
be due, as stated above, commencing on May 1, 1990 and continuing
thereafter, on the first day of each successive month through and
including the month of October, 1990. No payment shall be due
for the months of November, 1990 through April, 1991.
Thereafter, payments shall be due as stated above, commencing on
May 1, 1991 and continuing thereafter on the 1st day of each
successive month until all principal and accrued interest is paid
in full.
This note may be prepaid in whole or in part without
penalty.
This note shall at the option of any holder hereof be
immediately due and payable upon the occurrence of any of the
following:
1. Failure to make any payment due hereunder within 15 days
of its due date.
2. Brea<-:: of any condition of the Security Agreement on
property granted as collateral or security for this note.
3. Upon the filing by the undersigned of an assignment for
the benefit of creditors, bankruptcy, or for relief under any
provisions of the Federal Bankruptcy Code; or by suffering an
involuntary petition in bankruptcy or receivership to be filed
and not vacated within 30 days.
In the event this note shall be in default, and placed with
an attorney for collection, then the undersigned agrees to pay
all reasonable attorney fees and costs of collection. Payments

[HIBJJ
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not made within five (5) days of due date shall be subject to a
late charge of-1.5% of said payment. All payments hereunder
shall be made to the address set forth above or to such address
as may from time to time be designated by any holder hereof.
The undersigned agrees to remain fully bound hereunder until
this note shall be fully paid. The undersigned further waives
demand, presentment and protest and all notices thereto and
further agrees"to remain bound, notwithstanding any extension,
modification, waiver or other indulgence by any holder or upon
the exchange, substitution, or release of any collateral granted
as security for this note. No modification or indulgence by any
holder hereof shall be binding unless in writing; and any
indulgence on any one occasion shall not be an indulgence for any
other future occasion.
The rights of any holder hereof shall be
cumulative and not necessarily successive. This note shall be
construed, governed and enforced in accordance with the laws of
the State of Utah.
This note is subject to a Security Agreement of even date.
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC.

By
President

Id uniogump.not
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Mark S. Swan - 3873
David W. Overholt - A3846
RICHER/ SWAN & OVERHOLT, P,C,
A Professional Corporation
311 South State Street
Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-8632
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Union Park Associates

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERS TO
DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET
OF INTERROGATORIES

UNION PARK ASSOCIATES, a Utah
Limited Partnership,
Plaintiff,
v.
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE,
INC- ,

Civil No.

Defendant.
INTERROGATORY NO, 1;

Judge:
How

much

900906725 CV

Anne M. Stirba

of

the

square

footage

involved in the leased premises was included in the 10,039 square
feet leased to Matrix Funding Corporation on November 23, 1988?
ANSWER:

All of the square footage of the leased premises was

included in the space leased to Matrix Funding Corporation by lease
dated November 23, 1988 and occupied January 1, 1989.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

Apart

from

Matrix

Funding

Corporation, Miles, Inc. and Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., has any person or

EXHIBIT
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entity occupied, used or benefitted from all or any portion of the
leased premises since May, 1988?
(a)

If so, answer the following:

The name of the person or entity who occupied, used

or benefitted from the leased premises;
(b)

The date said person or entity occupied, used or

benefitted from the leased premises;
(c)

Describe

the

nature

of

the

occupancy,

use

or

benefit.
ANSWER:

Assuming that Gump & Ayers left the leased premises

in May, 1988, which they apparently dispute, Plaintiff is unaware
of any other person or entity which occupied the leased premises
since that date, other than the entities listed by Defendant.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

State all facts upon which you rely

in support of your claim that

Plaintiff was

"forced" to make

improvements as noted in Paragraph 30 of the Affidavit of Thomas
Lloyd.

With respect to each such fact, answer the following:
(a)

The name and address of the person who has or claims

to have personal knowledge as to such facts;
(b)

Identify any documents which you claim support the

existence of any such facts.
ANSWER:

Defendant is obviously troubled by the use of the

word "forced" in the Affidavit of Thomas Lloyd.

This word was

chosen as the best explanation of the commercial necessities to

2

improve and modify the leased premises to make it suitable to the
incoming tenant.

One factor that led to the need to make

improvements is the fact that the occupancy of the Defendant of the
space had caused a certain amount of wear and tear which was not
acceptable to the prospective tenant.

Furthermore, Gump & Ayers

had a distinctive decorating scheme, with colors of black and
green,

which

was

not

acceptable

to

the

incoming

tenant.

Consequently, the decorating scheme was not usable by any other
perspective tenant.

Further, it is standard in the industry for

the landlord to make leasehold improvements to the lease space to
accommodate the needs of the incoming tenant.

Consequently, when

Matrix Funding negotiated for the lease space, they negotiated for
certain changes to the space, including new carpet, a change in
walls and other similar items.

These items of improvements were

specifically negotiated and were minimized in order to keep the
cost of the improvements down, without having to pass those costs
through to the new tenant.
Union Park, as a landlord, also had a legal duty to mitigate
its damages by the re-letting of its premises. Because a landlord
must

take

positive

steps

to

re-let

the

premises, the

cost

associated with the readying ef the property for re-letting of the
premises, is its necessary, more often than not, to incur costs of
repairs and

alterations to meet the needs of a new tenant.
3

Therefore, the commercial realities and the legal duties combined
to "force" Plaintiff to make improvements to the property.
Those persons which have knowledge of the negotiations and
factors

concerning

Industries

and

the

Richard

improvements
Emery

are

of Matrix

Tom

Lloyd,

Funding.

of

Tom

address is 6925 Union Park Center, Suite 500, Midvale, Utah

Terra

Lloyd's
84047,

and Richard Emery's address is 6925 Union Park Center, Suite 250,
Midvale, Utah

84 047.

Plaintiff is not aware of any documents

which exist regarding the negotiations between Plaintiff and Matrix
Funding

for

the

improvements

made

improvements were orally negotiated.
documents

that

relate

to

the

property

as

those

Plaintiff does have copies of

to the cost of the

improvements, which

Defendant may obtain upon request.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4;

State all facts upon which you rely

in support of your claim that Plaintiff was "forced" to renegotiate
the lease with Matrix Funding Corporation as noted in Paragraph 28
of the Affidavit of Thomas Lloyd.

With respect to each such fact,

answer the following:
(a)

The name and address of the person who has or claims

to have personal knowledge as to such facts;
(b)

Identify any documents which you claim support the

existence of any such facts.
ANSWER:

Again, Defendant seems troubled by the use of the

4

word

"forced".

Perhaps

"commercially necessary".

a

better

phrase

would

have

been

It is a usual course of business for a

landlord to re-lease property at the then-prevailing lease rates.
Consequently, when negotiations began for the leasing of the
premises with Matrix Funding, the current market value of that
space was taken into account.

Other factors included the need to

meet Matrix Funding's existing needs, an attempt to find the best
available tenant, the size of the space, how quickly a tenant could
be located to minimize the impact of loss of lease revenues, and
the

fact that

relatively minor renovations were

incurred

in

conjunction with the improvement of this lease space for Matrix
Funding.

It is the opinion of Tom Lloyd, who has been in the

business for sixteen (16) years and who has negotiated numerous
leases at Union Park Plaza, that the lease with Matrix Funding in
November, 1988 was set at the relevant market rent, given all of
these factors.
Persons who have knowledge of the negotiations and factors
concerning the negotiation of the Matrix Funding Corporation lease
are Tom Lloyd of Terra Industries and Richard Emery of Matrix
Funding. Tom Lloyd's address is 6925 Union Park Center, Suite 500,
Midvale, Utah

84047.

Richard Emery's address is 6925 Union Park

Center, Suite 250, Midvale, Utah 84047. Plaintiff is not aware of
any documents which exist regarding the negotiations
5

between

Plaintiff

and

Matrix

Funding

for

the

lease

rate

as

those

negotiations were all done orally.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

State the name and address of each

and every person or entity who has been a general

or limited

partner and every person or entity who has been a general
limited partner

or

in the Plaintiff organization since January 1,

1987.
ANSWER:
5

in that

Complaint

Plaintiff objects to the scope of Interrogatory No.

it goes beyond
for

the

the

issues presented

enforceability

of

a

in

Plaintiff's

Settlement

Agreement.

However, if Defendant were willing to enter into a Confidentiality
Agreement

with

regard

to

the non-disclosure

of the names

and

persons who are involved as general and limited partners of the
Plaintiff,

then

Plaintiff

may

be

inclined

to

disclose

the

information requested by the Defendant.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6:
contract

or

agreement

to

Identify each and every transaction,
which

Plaintiff

and

Matrix

Funding

Corporation have both been parties since January 1, 1987.

Include

in your answer the following:
(a)

The date of the transaction, contract or agreement;

(b)

Identify all -documents arising out of or in any

manner connected with each transaction, contract or agreement.
ANSWER:

The only transaction between Plaintiff and Matrix

6

Funding is the lease entered into dated November 23, 1988 of the
former premises of Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc., which is the
subject of this litigation.

Defendant has all the documentation

regarding that lease transaction.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6 (sic):

Has Plaintiff and Matrix Funding

Corporation had any common employee since January 1, 1987?

If so,

answer the following:
(a)

The name and address of the common employee;

(b)

The

nature

of

the

services

performed

by

said

the

services

performed

by

said

employee for Plaintiff;
(c)

The

nature

of

employee for Matrix Funding Corporation;
(d)

The percentage contribution of Plaintiff and Matrix

Funding Corporation to compensation to said person.
ANSWER:

No.

INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

Since January 1, 1987, has Plaintiff

and Matrix Funding corporation shared office space or facilities?
If so, answer the following:
(a)

Describe the shared office space;

(b)

State the dates the office space was shared;

(c)

Describe the financial arrangement with respect to

the shared office space;
(d)

Describe the facilities that were shared;
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(e)

State the dates the facilities were shared;

(f)

Describe the financial arrangement with respect to

such sharing arrangement.
ANSWER:

No.

DATED this 71^

day of August, 1991.
UNION PARK ASSOCIATES, a Utah
Limited Partnership/

By:

^ 7
Thomas Lloyd,' G e n e r a l

STATE OF UTAH

Partner

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

On the
day of August, 1991, personally appeared before me
Thomas Lloyd, General Partner of Union Park Associates, a Utah
Limited Partnership, after being first duly sworn upon oath,
acknowledged to me that said individual has read the foregoing
instrument, believes the contents thereof, and executed the same of
the individuals free act and desire.
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this £!**>

day of August,

NOTAIV? PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake County

RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C,

larlt S. Swan
Attorney for Plaintiff
Union Park Associates
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the SO™

day of August, 1991, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon
the following parties by placing the same in the United States
mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:

Robert M. McDonald
MCDONALD & BULLEN
Attorneys for Defendant
Hermes Building
455 East 500 South
Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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